Let’s get this out of the way in which in the beginning: The Mariners are fairly good. Their beginning pitching is unimaginable, and a few projections programs even assume they’ve a top-10 offense. This isn’t a Pirates state of affairs, the place a core led by Paul Skenes on a league-minimum contract is someway projected to complete properly underneath .500. In Seattle, the items are virtually all there. Sadly for followers, “virtually all there” would possibly properly outline this period of Mariners baseball.
The most recent expression of Seattle’s complacency got here final week, when the group introduced again Jorge Polanco on a one 12 months, $7.75 million contract. (The deal is pending a bodily.) In line with a report from Adam Jude on the Seattle Occasions, Polanco’s signing means the “Mariners’ roster is successfully set.” For these counting at house, $3.5 million for 37-year-old Donovan Solano, a commerce for Austin Shenton, and the Polanco deal symbolize everything of Seattle’s offseason roster upgrades. The Mariners missed the playoffs by one sport in 2023 and 2024; they missed it by two video games in 2021. They’re at all times good however by no means nice. And the group — or at the very least possession — seems completely tremendous with that.
Mariners president of baseball operations Jerry Dipoto caught a whole lot of warmth for his 2023 remark that “these groups that win 54% of the time at all times wind up within the postseason,” and in all honesty I believe the intent of that remark was broadly misrepresented. (The road in that very same presser that they had been “really doing the fanbase a favor” a pair days after they missed the playoffs in all probability deserved extra scorn.) However the cause it sticks round, I believe, is as a result of the Mariners, as a franchise, appear hellbent on leveraging a wonderful cost-controlled core to win precisely 89 video games each season.
Since 2021, the Mariners have gained 54.47% of their common season video games. Regardless of sitting at that candy spot of the projected win totals, 12 months in and 12 months out, the place the worth of a marginal win is best, the group refuses to spend in free company to make even a considerably dangerous long-term guess.
To the Mariners’ credit score, they’ve traded for some impactful gamers; they even signed a kind of gamers, Luis Castillo, to a nine-figure extension. (Pay no thoughts to the truth that they’ve reportedly tried to dump the again half of that contract this offseason.) The latest of those trades introduced Randy Arozarena to the membership final July. He’ll now spend two extra years underneath group management on contracts which can be each artificially suppressed and nonetheless considerably expensive. (Arozarena is slated to make $11.3 million within the upcoming season.)
And there’s some cause for Seattle to keep away from long-term commitments to any infielders given the prospects coming by the ranks. Jude factors out that the state of the foremost league roster opens the door for high prospect Cole Younger to win a job out of spring coaching, or Ryan Bliss to make a short-term play for the second base gig. Prospect evaluators disagree on the standard of the Mariners’ minor league depth, however at the very least one sees their prospects as the perfect within the sport, outlined largely by their crop of place participant prospects creeping towards the excessive minors.
It additionally should be mentioned that to some extent they need to account for the contracts of the Mitches. This season, they may spend 18% of their payroll on two gamers whose projections are uncomfortably near alternative stage: Mitch Garver and Mitch Haniger. No less than Garver can slot in as an costly backup catcher, however Haniger absorbs a roster spot and $15.5 million of treasured payroll area, ostensibly limiting Seattle’s capability to splash money on the open market.
However the Mitches are solely a limitation in a world the place possession — led by John Stanton — refuses to entertain something apart from a middle-of-the-pack payroll. Lacking the playoffs by one sport for the second consecutive 12 months and responding by making Polanco the marquee signing is an abdication of accountability as stewards of this membership. In 2022, the Mariners led all of MLB in working revenue. It might be misguided to assume that they couldn’t comfortably add $30 million to the payroll to make a push for the division title.
So as a substitute of signing Alex Bregman to fill their third base gap, they introduced again Polanco. Third base? Sure, regardless that Polanco performed second base for the Mariners final 12 months, he’s reportedly going to slip over to the new nook this season.
At first look, this seems like a curious selection. Polanco posted -8 DRS and -10 OAA in his 112 video games as a second baseman final season; that latter mark ranked within the second percentile for his place. His arm power (75.6 mph) would have ranked because the slowest amongst all main league third basemen. Why make a poor defender with a noodle arm on the unsuitable facet of 30 change to a place the place he’ll must make even longer throws?
The Mariners, evidently, assume it’s going to assist “preserve him more healthy,” based on Jude’s report. I’m not precisely certain I comply with the logic there, however I do have another principle for why they assume the place change would possibly swimsuit him.
After I went to Polanco’s Statcast fielding web page, I seen that he rated particularly poor when he was transferring to his proper, and third basemen sometimes do not need to maneuver a lot in that particular lateral route. Maybe Polanco’s defensive worth would enhance by eliminating his most obtrusive weak spot.
I wished to take a better look. Sadly, MLB Superior Media makes this extraordinarily tough. My hope was to look at Polanco’s 20 worst performs or so by OAA to determine potential patterns. Whereas MLB does have this kind of data accessible for outfielders on a play-by-play foundation, the state of affairs is barely extra difficult for infielders. For these on the filth, they supply a lengthy JSON string with OAA worth per play, however just some figuring out data — the batter handedness, the house park, the launch velocity, and the month wherein the play occurred.
So in an effort to work out which performs of Polanco’s resulted in probably the most damaging OAA, I first needed to scrape that JSON string, then convert that JSON string right into a workable dataframe. As soon as I had that knowledge sorted by damaging OAA, I needed to manually determine each single play by inputting the parameters I outlined above right into a Statcast search. In almost all circumstances, there was just one play that matched every description, so I may confidently assert which performs aligned with which traces within the knowledge. However please MLB, there’s a neater method: Simply put the playid within the description! Why are you making me go on a scavenger hunt? Assist me assist you!
Anyway, I spent a pair hours doing this in an effort to deliver you, my pricey reader, solely the best defensive evaluation. And fortunately this work wasn’t in useless. I watched all of Polanco’s performs the place the batter reached base regardless of an estimated success price of at the very least 70%. That included all seven of his errors in addition to 15 performs that had been scored base hits.
On three of these hits, Polanco tried and did not go to his left. 4 had been scorching photographs proper at him that he couldn’t fairly corral. However the majority — 9 in all — featured Polanco transferring to his proper.
Throughout all of the performs I considered, this was the commonest sight:
And this:
And this:
And this:
Polanco gained’t must make performs like these at third base. Is that sufficient to ensure success? No. However it’s a cause why he is perhaps higher there than up the center.
However Polanco’s Mariners destiny gained’t be tied to his protection. It’s the bat that pays his payments, and it’s the bat that can make or break his worth to the membership.
There may be far much less thriller with the bat. Polanco’s objective is straight ahead: Pull the ball within the air. Kyle Bland’s Batted Ball Metrics app reveals the distribution of a batter’s balls in play relative to league common. Polanco’s tells a reasonably clear story:
The entire worth proposition of a man like Polanco is his capability to elevate balls to the pull facet — that is his strategy from each the left and proper facet of the plate. He doesn’t crush the ball, rating within the nineteenth percentile in bat velocity, however he will get to his energy ceiling by attacking pitches out in entrance with one of many steepest vertical bat angles within the league. He’s even able to unleashing an uppercut swing on slower velocity on the high of the zone, as Ronel Blanco found after hanging a changeup in Could:
In his finest years, Polanco married this aggressive strategy with comparatively low strikeout charges; in 2021, when he jacked 33 house runs, he struck out simply 18.3% of the time. Due to Polanco’s excessive air strategy — during the last three years, he’s hit the sixth-fewest groundballs of hitters with at the very least 1,000 plate appearances — he’s vulnerable to low BABIPs, which means it’s necessary for him to place as many balls in play as attainable.
As one would possibly anticipate given Seattle’s excessive park results, that strikeout price went operating within the unsuitable route final season. In Seattle, when batting left-handed, he struck out almost 37% of the time. Granted, Polanco battled knee and hamstring points final 12 months, and that strikeout price ticked down after his return in July. There are tales you could possibly inform to persuade your self that Polanco will return to a league-average stage with the stick, and even perhaps be somewhat higher than that.
There’s nothing unsuitable with Polanco, however there’s one thing unsuitable with the truth that he’s the premium roster improve for a Seattle group so near excellence. The Mariners, as at all times, are simply adequate to compete for a Wild Card. Given the core, and given the membership’s lack of even a pennant-winning season throughout its almost 50 years of existence, “simply adequate” shouldn’t be acceptable.