The Crimson Sox Did It All This Winter

Just a few weeks in the past, I took a high-level have a look at the Mets’ offseason overhaul. I assumed it got here out properly, and readers additionally appeared to love it, so I’m going to make use of that very same rubric to try the Crimson Sox right now. As earlier than, I’ll be specializing in wrapping all the staff’s selections up collectively and evaluating throughout a number of axes. As I put it final time:

“How ought to we consider a entrance workplace, significantly within the offseason after we don’t have video games to have a look at? I’ve by no means been capable of arrive at a single framework. That’s solely logical. If there have been one easy instrument we might use to guage the game, baseball wouldn’t be as fascinating to us as it’s. The metrics we use to guage groups, and even gamers, are mere abstractions. The purpose of baseball – successful video games, or successful the World Sequence in a broad sense – could be achieved in a ton of various methods. We measure a choose few of these in most of our makes an attempt at estimating worth, or at determining who “received” or “misplaced” a given transaction. So right now, I assumed I’d strive one thing a little bit bit totally different.”

I’m not going to present Boston a single grade. As an alternative, I’m going to guage the selections that Craig Breslow and the Crimson Sox made on three axes. The primary is what I’m calling Coherence of Technique. In the event you make a win-now commerce however then head into the season with a gaping gap in your roster, that’s not coherent. If you end up on the borderline of the playoffs after which begin subtracting, that’s not coherent. It’s by no means fairly that easy in the actual world, however good groups make units of selections that work towards the identical purpose.

Subsequent, Liquidity and Optionality. One factor we all know for certain about baseball is that the longer term hardly ever appears to be like the way in which we anticipate it to within the current. Preserving a capability to alter instructions primarily based on new data is essential. Why do groups deal with gamers with no choices remaining so callously? It’s as a result of that lack of optionality actually stings. Why do groups favor high-dollar, short-term contracts over prolonged pacts typically? It’s since you don’t know the way good that man goes to be in yr six, and also you actually don’t know the way good your staff will probably be or whether or not you’ll have one other participant for a similar place. All else equal, selections that scale back future optionality are dangerous as a result of they restrict a staff’s skill to make the proper transfer sooner or later. One observe on optionality: It’s not the identical as not having any lengthy contracts. Lengthy contracts to key gamers truly enhance flexibility, as a result of “have a number of stars” is a key a part of constructing a championship staff. Not having a star underneath contract while you want one is nearly as a lot of an issue as having too many growing older veterans, and I’ll take into account each variations of flexibility.

Lastly, maximizing the Championship Chance Distribution. We like to speak about groups as chasing wins, however that’s not precisely what’s happening. Groups are chasing the probability of successful a World Sequence, or some shut proxy of that. That’s correlated with wins, but it surely’s not precisely the identical. Constructing a staff that outperforms opponents on the energy of its Fifteenth-Twenty sixth greatest gamers being far superior to their counterparts on different golf equipment may assist in the canine days of August, when everybody’s taking part in their depth items and cobbling collectively a rotation, however that received’t fly in October. Likewise, high-variance gamers with first rate backup choices don’t present up as overly precious in a degree estimate of WAR, however they completely matter. Groups are each making an attempt to get to the playoffs as usually as attainable and carry out in addition to they’ll after arriving there. That’s not a simple factor to quantify, however we will no less than give it a shot.

The Sox got here into the offseason with a reasonably clear downside to unravel. Alex Bregman opted out of his deal and returned to free company, which left the roster in a very unbalanced state. Boston’s greatest 4 place gamers had been all outfielders – Roman Anthony, Jarren Duran, Ceddanne Rafaela, and Wilyer Abreu. The infield was comparatively barren. Trevor Story and Romy Gonzalez had been the one two holdovers who notched even 250 plate appearances within the dust. Rafaela performed almost as many video games within the infield as Marcelo Mayer, the staff’s prime shortstop prospect, final yr.

The rotation didn’t have precisely the identical imbalance, but it surely too wanted bulking up. That they had a number of fascinating prospects, however solely Garrett Crochet and Brayan Bello as bankable choices on the prime, and Bello is extra of a pleasant mid-rotation arm than an ace. Breslow’s very best consequence can be a brand new rotation and a brand new infield.

Oh, one final thing: The Sox paid a piddling $1.5 million for exceeding the CBT threshold in 2025. That’s a rounding error when it comes to greenback outlay, however there are penalties for exceeding the cap in consecutive years. The bottom tax charge will increase from 20% to 30%, after which to 50% for three-in-a-row overages. That’s simply sloppy, truthfully; exceeding the tax by a minuscule quantity supplies little on-field profit however makes future spending extra painful. Coming into this offseason, it might have behooved them both to get beneath the CBT threshold in time for the beginning of this season, or to lean into it and spend extra — sitting on the identical degree, simply over the cap, can be the worst attainable possibility.

We’ll begin with pitching and go principally chronologically right here, as a result of lots of Boston’s offseason maneuvering comes right down to buying and selling, and who you possibly can commerce away relies upon closely on who you haven’t but traded away. The first actual transfer of the winter was the beginning of a fruitful pipeline: The Sox despatched Richard Fitts, Brandon Clarke, and a participant to be named later to the Cardinals in alternate for Sonny Grey. The Playing cards kicked in some money to offset Grey’s backloaded contract, reducing his CBT hit to $21 million.

That is a simple win for the Sox. They had been flush with backend-starter sorts like Fitts (50 FV as a prospect, 5.80 FIP in 45 main league innings), however these guys aren’t precisely bankable choices. That matches the Championship Chance Distribution side of my analysis nearly completely. The Crimson Sox are presumptive World Sequence contenders with a humiliation of riches on the depth starter entrance. Dropping Fitts (and Clarke, who’s a number of years away from a giant league debut) doesn’t impression their flooring by a lot. Including Grey raises their ceiling, although – he’s fifth amongst main league pitchers in WAR over the previous three seasons, and even if you happen to suppose that overstates his skill, our projection methods have him twelfth amongst starters this yr. He’s an elite playoff starter, in different phrases.

This commerce was a web hit to Boston’s flexibility, however not massively so. Certain, having Fitts and Clarke round with lots of staff management is good, however context issues. The Crimson Sox have a near-perpetual 40-man roster crunch, and now they’ve a dependable frontline starter who will ship an incredible yr after which vanish from that roster as a substitute of Fitts, an up-and-down arm. Guys like Fitts (and to a lesser extent Clarke, a high-variance prospect who may find yourself as a reliever) are sometimes extra helpful to contending groups as commerce chips than on the sphere, and I believe that’s precisely what occurred right here.

The Sox adopted up that deal by making one other swap with an NL Central membership. This one is much less of a slam dunk to me, however nonetheless one: They acquired Johan Oviedo and Tyler Samaniego in alternate for Jhostynxon Garcia, with a number of different prospects altering fingers within the deal, as properly. Oviedo is, to a primary approximation, a Fitts substitute. He’s had points with command in his four-year main league profession, however with large stuff that typically makes the general bundle work anyway. He’s proper on the swingman line; he’s going to present you lots of five-and-dive begins, however he may be greatest suited throwing fewer, higher-leverage innings as a substitute.

The explanation for this commerce comes right down to roster administration. Garcia was on the 40-man roster however didn’t have an inexpensive path to taking part in time. The Sox are overflowing with outfielders, and he was one thing like their sixth possibility on the market. He was too precious to take away from the 40, although; he’d get claimed by principally the whole league. This commerce repurposed that spot right into a pitcher. Oviedo is much more prone to contribute to the trigger this yr than Garcia. Samaniego additionally requires a 40-man spot, however that’s OK: He’s almost main league prepared, and with all his choices remaining, he’s a pleasant versatile bullpen piece. I believe Boston gave up a little bit of expertise on this deal within the mixture accounting – however turning an outfield surplus into pitching was good enterprise anyway.

With these two trades squared away, the Crimson Sox completed their pitching overhaul by signing Ranger Suárez to a five-year, $130 million contract. Suárez is one other pitcher within the Grey mildew, a starter you’d be comfortable to expire in a playoff collection, even if you happen to wouldn’t be overjoyed to deploy him as your ace. 5 years is lengthy sufficient that I’m not in love with the Liquidity and Optionality a part of this deal. The one different Crimson Sox gamers underneath contract that lengthy are both stars (Crochet and Anthony) or on discount contracts (Rafaela, Bello, and Kristian Campbell). However the thought of preserving optionality is that in case your roster has contractual flexibility, you possibly can stretch so as to add essential gamers with out worrying in regards to the monetary implications. I’d argue that their current payroll flexibility is what allow them to signal Suárez within the first place, and on condition that he’s participant at a place of want, I like what they did right here.

Including Suárez modifications the Championship Chance Distribution a part of the equation. Between Crochet, Grey, and Suárez, the Crimson Sox have probably the greatest prime threes in baseball. Between Bello, Payton Tolle, and Connelly Early, they’ve a number of choices to fill out a playoff rotation with a fourth starter. Oviedo may even technically slot in that group. It’s a reasonably injury-proof unit, too; it might take lots of accidents earlier than the Crimson Sox couldn’t subject a decent four-man playoff rotation.

Within the mixture, these pitching strikes had been nice. The Crimson Sox went from a top-heavy rotation with large reliance on Crochet to a rotation with loads of redundancy and plenty of good playoff starter choices. Earlier than, they had been relying on Tolle and Early to develop. Now, any enchancment there can be a bonus. Boston didn’t sacrifice excessively on the prospect entrance, and even the payroll entrance, to take action. Certain, the Sox surrendered a little bit little bit of payroll flexibility, however not a ton, and so they received a marquee free agent for doing so. Including two starters who venture for a mixed 7.2 WAR for $47 million in payroll this yr is a coup, plain and easy.

Whereas Boston was overhauling its rotation utilizing cash and mid-level prospects, the remainder of the league signed all the good infielders in free company. This was the massive fear coming into the winter: The free company class wasn’t heavy on difference-makers who play the infield. However the Crimson Sox opted for non-free-agency options as a substitute, a worthwhile pivot in my estimation.

Consider it this fashion: Buying and selling for a pitcher of Suárez’s stature with a number of years of staff management remaining is principally not possible. MacKenzie Gore, Edward Cabrera, and Shane Baz have all been worse than Suárez in recent times, and so they all fetched massive returns in trades. Grey is a rental, certain, however by paying a number of the cash on his deal and buying and selling with a rebuilder, the Sox paid much less in different methods. When the Mets acquired Freddy Peralta, they needed to pony up extra prospect capital than Boston did. Pitching is in scorching demand nowadays, and the Sox managed to get lots of it with out surrendering an enormous sum of money or expertise.

Buying and selling for a primary baseman? Simpler. The Crimson Sox took benefit of their newfound rotation depth by heading again to former government Chaim Bloom and the Cardinals for one other deal; they acquired first baseman Willson Contreras in alternate for Hunter Dobbins and two lesser prospects. Contreras instantly turned Boston’s best-hitting infielder, and perhaps their greatest right-handed hitter, interval. In three years with St. Louis, he put up a 129 wRC+, and he even regarded cheap defensively after making the change from catcher.

If Contreras had been on the open market this winter, he’d be probably the greatest 10 or so hitters obtainable. Taking into consideration the cash the Playing cards despatched the Sox, he’s underneath contract for $34.5 million over the following two years. That’s approach lower than the same hitter would get on the open market. Is Pete Alonso a greater guess to supply than Contreras in 2026? Most likely. However I don’t suppose the hole is that prime – each present above-average offense with minimal defensive flexibility. I believe that Alonso’s deal can be meaningfully much less fascinating from the Optionality and Liquidity side of my evaluation. Protecting contracts for marginal gamers quick – and bat-only first basemen of their 30s are robotically marginal, merely primarily based on mixture growing older curves – is a great enterprise choice.

Don’t take this to imply that the Cardinals received swindled or something. Dobbins is an fascinating depth starter, significantly for a staff that has the posh of giving him loads of taking part in time to see if he can determine a pitch combine that unlocks a little bit bit greater than he’s displayed thus far. However the Sox had too many guys with that actual profile. Dobbins would have been seventh or so within the pecking order, and even worse, he tore his ACL final July, so there’s harm uncertainty in addition. The opposite prospects within the deal are the kind that good farm methods churn out recurrently, and I believe it was totally cheap to dump them for offense. They spent from one in every of their surpluses to improve a place of weak spot.

The final transfer of the winter tied issues collectively. Even after including Contreras, Boston wanted extra infielders. After arising utterly empty in free company, the Crimson Sox executed a novel technique: They traded for a younger, controllable infielder as a substitute of their established methodology of coping with the Cardinals for a veteran. This time, they received Caleb Durbin in a swap with the Brewers.

Durbin’s contact-heavy method and defensive chops give him a stable flooring. Even when he posts a middling offensive line, plus protection at second or third will make him a mean contributor general. That’s a giant enchancment for a staff that often performed guys who didn’t meet that bar final season. Boston performed some dangerous infielders throughout their journey to the playoffs, and that was regardless of having Bregman on the roster. The Sox used Rafaela at second for twenty-four video games despite the fact that he may be the perfect defensive middle fielder within the massive leagues. I spent some time explaining how their rotation wanted some upgrades to lift its ceiling potential, however the infield wanted a flooring overhaul. Durbin is strictly that. I’m not anticipating him to be a perennial All-Star, however he’s regular in a approach that many Boston infielders haven’t been in recent times.

This commerce is a basic instance of 1 that I like, despite the fact that it doesn’t stand out from an anticipated worth standpoint. The Sox gave up so much to get Durbin, and so they’re shopping for comparatively excessive; 2025 was the perfect season of his skilled profession. They gave up a shiny post-hype sleeper in Kyle Harrison, and Shane Drohan is not any mere throw-in. However the Sox spent all winter turning their rotation right into a staff energy, thereby making each Harrison’s and Drohan’s paths to fast massive league relevance trickier. That meant they may as soon as once more deal from energy to deal with weak spot.

That is the uncommon deal that I believe works throughout the board. It meaningfully will increase Liquidity and Optionality; Durbin can play second and third, Andruw Monasterio and Anthony Seigler present additional infield insurance coverage, and all of these guys have gobs of staff management remaining. There’s even a compensation decide in there to present the Sox extra choices within the upcoming draft. Championship Chance Distribution is clearly improved right here; an infield harm will get a lot much less scary with all this newly acquired depth, whereas Boston already had sufficient pitchers that shedding Harrison and Drohan doesn’t negatively have an effect on the staff’s flooring. Lastly, Coherence of Technique appears to be like good; the high-end pitchers the Crimson Sox signed allowed them to deal from depth. Nice piece of enterprise right here, even when Durbin disappoints considerably relative to his 2025 numbers.

These had been the massive strikes of the winter, however Boston additionally did some trimming across the edges. Earlier than final season even ended, the Crimson Sox retained Aroldis Chapman on a one-year deal. That was principally the top of their funding within the bullpen, and that’s simply wonderful with me; with all of the depth starters they’ve lined up, no less than a number of of them will be capable of contribute in reduction. Between Chapman and Garrett Whitlock, the Sox have a number of choices for high-leverage spots.

Simply earlier than buying and selling for Durbin, additionally they signed Isiah Kiner-Falefa to a one-year deal price $6 million. That is good hedging. Certain, Durbin and Contreras are precious infield additions, however even with them within the fold, depth is a query. Story has performed in lower than half of the obtainable video games since becoming a member of the Crimson Sox 4 years in the past, and he’s eclipsed 400 plate appearances solely as soon as in that point span. Mayer, one other presumptive Opening Day starter, struggled with main league pitching in 2025 and has harm issues of his personal. There’s little probability that Kiner-Falefa has a beginning position on a wholesome Boston squad, however there’s additionally little probability that Boston has a wholesome squad all yr. His versatility, and the comparatively low-cost price ticket, make him a superb addition despite the fact that he doesn’t transfer the needle all that a lot except another person will get harm.

Lastly, a little bit cross-Sox motion: Boston despatched Jordan Hicks to the White Sox, paying down a few of his wage and attaching a prospect to make the deal work. That one was totally about payroll. Hicks had no place on the squad; he wore out his welcome with 21 appearances and a 6.19 FIP (8.20 ERA, it was ugly). He was acquired as wage ballast within the first place, and now the Crimson Sox are paying him much less to pitch on the South Aspect.

In the event you have a look at the combination impression of Boston’s strikes this winter, it’s simple to see the place this roster has improved. Ranging from a staff that wanted top-end starters and a complete new infield, the Crimson Sox completed most of what they wished. From a Coherence of Technique standpoint, they did masterfully properly. I’m not saying I agree with one leg of the technique, specifically their refusing to commerce from the outfield logjam. However Breslow has been constant in refusing to commerce these guys except somebody affords him a king’s ransom, and he developed a method that addressed a lot of the largest issues with the roster anyway.

That’s simple to say, however exhausting to do. There have been lots of groups out there for bankable pitching, thumping first basemen, and versatile infielders this winter. There are lots of groups out there for these issues each winter, actually. However by procuring slightly below the very best tier of the pitching market, buying and selling for veterans, and dealing from surplus, Boston received what it wanted and put collectively a stable squad for 2026 with depth choices throughout the board.

I’m impressed by the group’s skill to try this whereas sustaining flexibility, which implies I give the staff stable marks for Liquidity and Optionality. You need your greatest guys on lengthy offers, your position gamers cost-controlled for years to return, and your good-but-not-great veterans on short-term contracts. The Crimson Sox didn’t fairly handle that in Suárez’s case, however they got here fairly shut, and I believe that in complete they arrange their future payroll scenario fairly properly. By 2028, the one Sox on assured contracts will probably be Crochet, Anthony, Suárez, Bello, Campbell, and Rafaela. Solely Crochet, Suárez, and Bello will probably be incomes eight figures on these offers. In different phrases, when it comes time to signal a brand new crop of veterans within the Contreras or Story mildew, there will probably be payroll house to take action.

Giving up a bunch of prospects and younger main league pitchers to make this all work stings a little bit, undoubtedly. However whereas they subtracted from their prospect pipeline, they did so in a approach that also leaves it among the many higher methods in baseball. In an period the place groups more and more maintain onto their greatest prospects, including three totally different precious main league starters with out buying and selling from the highest of the farm system is superb work certainly.

That every one feeds into the Championship Chance Distribution. The Sox are fairly clearly higher arrange this yr than they had been on the shut of 2025. Their roster continues to be a little bit misshapen – they’re DH’ing defender in Duran, Masataka Yoshida is a sunk price, and the infield continues to be a tiny bit sketchy – however regardless of these flaws, they’ve improved each their ceiling and flooring with these strikes. Ceiling? They now have a rotation that may win playoff video games by itself if every little thing breaks proper. If the three prime guys keep wholesome and one in every of both Early or Tolle breaks out, this may very well be a scary group. Flooring? The Crimson Sox now have extra competent infielders than they’ve been capable of name on for years, and so they nonetheless have loads of pitching depth regardless of dealing from it.

One place the Sox couldn’t fairly tie every little thing collectively: their payroll. We have now them down for a CBT payroll of $264 million, $20 million over the primary tax threshold. That’s a sufficiently small overage that it’s not catastrophic – they’ll owe 30% of that in tax with no different penalties, on condition that they aren’t exceeding the primary threshold by $40 million. They’ve sufficient room beneath that concentrate on that even when they add wage on the commerce deadline, they’re in all probability protected. Sure, exceeding the cap by a tiny quantity in 2025 means it will price them barely extra, however that was up to now. There’s no use crying over spilled milk. I don’t suppose the Sox might have spent lower than they did and nonetheless put collectively a championship-caliber roster, so kudos to them for understanding that ducking the tax wasn’t crucial.

May they’ve managed a distinct permutation of trades and signings? I believe not. In the event that they flip-flopped their technique and traded for a pitcher as a substitute of signing Suárez, I believe they’d have gotten a worse starter whereas surrendering greater than they did within the Durbin and Contreras trades. In the meantime, the hitters they may have signed with the cash that went to Suárez aren’t apparent enhancements on Contreras and Durbin.

There’s one final thing price contemplating right here: Would the Crimson Sox have been higher off conserving Rafael Devers final summer season? I’ll inform you up entrance that I don’t have a transparent reply, however we will no less than use this framework to contemplate how the staff would look in an alternate world the place he by no means left. Their payroll construction can be meaningfully totally different: $30 million a yr for the following eight years meaningfully crimps your flexibility. Alternatively, locking up your prime-age stars for eight years can be factor. The Contreras commerce doesn’t occur if the Sox have already got Devers transitioning to first base, for instance, and the Durbin commerce appears to be like fairly totally different with out Harrison within the deal. On the opposite different hand, the Sox traded away a prospect simply to dump a part of Hicks’ wage, so that they wouldn’t do this both. There are lots of transferring items to consider.

My last estimation is that I simply don’t know. The true figuring out issue as as to if buying and selling Devers was a good suggestion isn’t how your staff appears to be like in February 2026; it’s whether or not the offensive thunder he supplies over the following half-decade is well worth the threat of decline later. I’m not in place to reply that right now. None of us are, truthfully. As I’m fond of claiming in evaluating offers like these, the longer term is unknown and unknowable. But it surely’s price mentioning that I’m increased on the Devers commerce than I used to be on the time for 2 causes.

First, the Sox are spending the cash they saved. Their payroll goes to be increased this yr than it was final yr. They went out and signed a prime free agent whereas additionally including wage in trades. They managed their payroll intelligently fairly than simply torpedoing the offseason to get beneath the CBT line. At this level, I believe it might be unreasonable to say that the Sox traded Devers as a result of they’re unwilling to spend cash. I used to be much less sure of that on the time of the deal, so my opinion of their decision-making has commensurately improved.

Second, they’ve demonstrated a willingness to maneuver on from the fellows they acquired within the Devers commerce. Three of the 4 gamers they acquired are already out the door, actually, all by way of commerce. I didn’t significantly like their return for Devers, however because it seems, neither did they, or no less than they noticed the fellows they received again as items they may ship onward to maintain bettering the roster. That’s signal; flexibility of pondering is one thing I prize in entrance places of work, and whereas the entire “you’ll pry these outfielders from our chilly lifeless fingers” factor doesn’t do it for me, opportunistically buying and selling Harrison makes me suppose higher of the Boston mind belief.

So, no letter grade or something on the finish of all of this, however I’m fairly impressed with what the Crimson Sox did this winter. You may think about another world the place they miss on Bregman, double down on saving cash, and find yourself with an incomplete roster that may’t actually sustain within the AL East. They did principally the alternative, although, and constructed a reasonably good staff because of this.