This postseason, I’m persevering with my use of a brand new format for our managerial report playing cards. Prior to now, I went by way of each recreation from each supervisor, whether or not they performed 22 video games en path to profitable the World Sequence or obtained swept out of the Wild Card spherical. To be sincere, I hated writing these transient blurbs. Nobody is all that within the supervisor who ran out the identical lineup twice, or noticed his starters get trounced and used his greatest relievers anyway as a result of the sequence was so brief. This yr, I’m skipping the primary spherical, and grading solely the managers who survived till at the least the best-of-five sequence. Earlier this week, I graded Aaron Boone and A.J. Hinch. At present, we’ll proceed with the 2 managers who misplaced within the Nationwide League Divisional Sequence, Craig Counsell and Rob Thomson.
My aim is to judge every supervisor when it comes to course of, not outcomes. In the event you usher in your greatest pitcher to face their greatest hitter in an enormous spot, that’s an excellent choice whatever the final result. Strive a triple steal with the bases loaded solely to have the opposite workforce make 4 throwing errors to attain three runs? I’m in all probability going to name {that a} blunder despite the fact that it labored out. Managers do loads of different issues — getting workforce buy-in for brand spanking new methods or unconventional bullpen utilization behind closed doorways is a talent I discover significantly useful — however as I’ve no perception into how that’s completed or how every supervisor differs, I can’t precisely assign grades for it.
I’m additionally purposefully avoiding obscure qualitative issues like “trusting your veterans as a result of they’ve been there earlier than.” Playoff protection lovingly focuses on clutch performs by confirmed performers, however Cam Schlittler and Michael Busch had been additionally nice this October. Overlook trusting your veterans; the playoffs are about trusting your greatest gamers. Cristopher Sánchez is essential as a result of he’s nice, not due to the variety of playoff sequence he’s appeared in. There’s nothing inherently good about having been round a very long time; once I’m evaluating choices, “however he’s a veteran” simply doesn’t enter my thought course of.
I’m all the time searching for new analytical wrinkles in critiquing managerial choices. For example, I’ve more and more come to view pitching choices as a tradeoff between defending your greatest relievers from overexposure and minimizing your starters’ weakest matchups, which signifies that I’m grading managers on a number of axes in each recreation. I feel that just about no pitching choice is a no brainer lately; there are simply too many competing priorities to make something completely apparent. Which means I’m going to be much less sure in my analysis of pitching than of hitting, however I’ll attempt to make my confidence degree clear in every case. Let’s get to it.
Craig Counsell
Batting: A+
The Cubs hit the playoffs with a roster that made Counsell’s job pretty simple on the offensive aspect. That may sound like an excellent factor, however that’s not what was taking place right here; the workforce’s bench simply by no means got here collectively. Justin Turner light down the stretch. Willi Castro was beneath alternative degree after becoming a member of Chicago in midseason. Moisés Ballesteros was in all probability the most effective pinch-hitting choice, however he wasn’t a severe consideration to interchange Carson Kelly within the beginning lineup. In different phrases, it was principally plug and play.
To face the Padres and their secure of righty starters, Counsell led off with Michael Busch, as he did all yr in opposition to righties, and slotted Kyle Tucker in fourth. Tucker DH’ed all through the playoffs and regarded at the least partially compromised, however I don’t assume Counsell had any different to enjoying him and hoping it might work. The primary time that the Padres introduced in a lefty, Adrian Morejon, Counsell’s plan grew to become clear: Except it was late sufficient {that a} second at-bat for that spot within the order was unlikely, Busch and Tucker had been staying within the recreation even when they drew a nasty platoon matchup. Provided that the Padres solely had two lefties, I appreciated the choice, and the Cubs received an uneventful opener with out making any offensive substitutions.
That sample held for your entire sequence, with only one exception: Ballesteros coming in for Matt Shaw in opposition to Mason Miller, a transfer I accredited of. Aside from that, the massive transfer was that Ian Happ bunted in Recreation 3, however I didn’t even hate the bunt: 3-0 lead, man on second with nobody out within the backside of the seventh inning. That’s a small win chance swing both means, however two issues made me like this name extra. First, it was a shock bunt, and the Padres weren’t in place to subject it. Second, Happ is pretty good at shock bunts for a success; he was batting .400, with solely a single catastrophe final result in 10 profession bunts in opposition to a daily protection. Not solely was there little or no probability of this backfiring, however a greater bunt may need made Happ secure.
In opposition to Milwaukee, Counsell began the identical means he had in opposition to San Diego, utilizing Ballesteros to interchange Shaw in opposition to a troublesome righty and in any other case letting the lineup flip over uninterrupted. That modified within the second recreation of the sequence. The Brewers made their first unconventional pitching transfer, beginning reliever Aaron Ashby as an opener, and Counsell countered by inserting Turner for his first at-bats of the postseason. What’s extra, he hit him leadoff, in Busch’s regular spot, in order that the lineup may flip over to regular as quickly as Ashby, Milwaukee’s greatest lefty reliever, departed. Counsell truly obtained two Turner/Ashby at-bats out of his gambit, and Turner transformed one in all them right into a single. After that, although, the Brewers ran out a string of fine relievers and Counsell didn’t have any counters; even with the tiny fringe of the Turner matchup, the Cubs simply couldn’t get any traction.
The worst matchups Counsell ended up with on this sequence had been in all probability lefties pitching to Pete Crow-Armstrong; he confronted 4 southpaws and regarded fairly dangerous in these at-bats. I feel Counsell would have been keen to sub out PCA late within the recreation, however the Brewers had been sensible about attacking him with lefties early within the recreation, when Counsell’s elimination would each compromise his protection and end in shedding Crow-Armstrong’s bat in opposition to righties in future innings. A sacrifice bunt, up 4 runs within the sixth inning of Recreation 4, was in all probability an excellent final result for a type of PCA/Ashby matchups, and usually I feel that Counsell is superb at understanding when bunts are good tactical performs, and training that into his gamers in order that even their bunt-for-hit makes an attempt are available in good spots.
On the finish of the day, I don’t assume that Counsell may have pulled any batting levers in a different way right here. He obtained his chosen pinch-hitters – Turner in opposition to lefties, Ballesteros in opposition to righties – into the sport often, which is particularly spectacular provided that Turner may solely actually change one man (Busch). The Cubs simply weren’t a platooning/switching workforce, and Counsell didn’t attempt to power one thing that wasn’t going to work. I actually appreciated his mild contact right here – and I upgraded his A to an A+ due to the lovable little Turner-leading-off transfer.
Pitching: B
With Shota Imanaga ineffective to shut out the yr and accidents leaving Cade Horton unavailable, Counsell had his work reduce out for him on the run prevention entrance. Matthew Boyd drew the primary begin in opposition to the Padres, and Counsell managed by the new-school e-book; 18 batters and a visit to the showers. Daniel Palencia was the primary reliever in, a sensible choice in opposition to the highest of the San Diego lineup, after which Counsell performed matchups by utilizing lefty Drew Pomeranz in opposition to the underside of the order, Andrew Kittredge for an additional crack on the Fernando Tatis Jr. part, after which Brad Keller to lock down the save. Palencia could be the workforce’s nominal nearer, however Counsell was simply matching up good pitchers in opposition to good hitters.
To assist Imanaga navigate that scary part of the Padres lineup, Counsell turned to Kittredge as an opener for Recreation 2. I wasn’t in love with giving him the highest of the order twice in a row, however I don’t see a means round it given the best way the matchups stacked up within the first recreation. In any case, Imanaga got here in in opposition to the lefties on the backside of the order.
I’m not anti-opener, however I disliked how the Cubs executed this one. Usually talking, openers are helpful as a result of you may line up your starter in opposition to the part of their lineup that’s most advantageous to your workforce. You may think about Imanaga going through the six by way of 9 hitters thrice every, then departing earlier than getting the highest of the order a 3rd time. You may think about him going through these backside 4 hitters twice, for 13 complete batters confronted, after which leaving earlier than the scary righties get one other chew on the apple. However Counsell obtained caught in between, and Imanaga obtained completely torched in his second try at Tatis and Manny Machado; Machado cracked a three-run bomb to interrupt a scoreless tie. Then Counsell pulled Imanaga for a lefty reliever as a substitute of getting him assault the lefties on the backside of the order once more. Why even trouble with an opener should you’re going to make use of the follower that means? The one batter that Counsell prevented Imanaga from going through twice was Xander Bogaerts; seems like a whole lot of work for no acquire. Quite a lot of low-leverage relievers tag-teamed the remainder of the sport, leaving Chicago as rested as may moderately be anticipated for Recreation 3.
You already understand how Counsell needed to handle, and he was capable of do it simply as he drew it up within the final recreation in opposition to the Padres. Jameson Taillon made it by way of 4 innings and 14 batters, Caleb Thielbar got here in to get the lefty pocket, after which it was hammer time. Palencia obtained the massive boppers, Pomeranz obtained the lefties the following time they appeared, after which Keller and Kittredge switched locations, with Keller dealing with the highest of the order and Kittredge locking down the save after Keller faltered. I appreciated this flip-flop; retaining the most effective San Diego hitters from seeing Kittredge three days in a row has a whole lot of benefit, and it’s not like he and Keller are meaningfully completely different when it comes to chance of locking down the save.
The primary recreation of the Brewers sequence gave Counsell the worst type of psychological break; Boyd gave up a six-spot within the first inning, at which level it was time for the low-leverage brigade; shout out to Aaron Civale for 4 1/3 scoreless innings of aid in opposition to his previous membership. For the second recreation, Counsell gave up the opener charade in entrance of Imanaga and let him begin often. Sadly for the Cubs, Imanaga simply wasn’t proper, and he’s homer-prone even when he’s at his greatest. Andrew Vaughn crushed a three-run shot within the first, and William Contreras added a solo dinger within the third. When Christian Yelich reached, bringing Vaughn up once more, Counsell did what I might have executed: He pulled the plug and summoned Palencia for his playoff fireman function.
Within the fourth, Palencia simply obtained crushed, giving up a large dwelling run to Jackson Chourio that broke the sport huge open. That occurs, although: Counsell put his greatest reliever in on the correct time, however making an excellent choice doesn’t assure an excellent final result. He then noticed the writing on the wall and shut issues down; Colin Rea, additionally a former Brewer, pitched 3 1/3 innings of scoreless aid to wind down the sport.
Together with his again in opposition to the wall, Counsell caught to his plan within the subsequent recreation; 18 batters for Taillon, then a mix-and-match number of relievers following. He used Pomeranz in opposition to lefties, Palencia in opposition to the 4-5-6 a part of the order, Kittredge to maintain the road transferring, Thielbar for an additional journey by way of that swath of lefties, after which Keller for a four-out save to shut issues out. That is precisely what I’d wish to do if I had been working the Cubs: use the great relievers in a good, must-win recreation, then work out tomorrow’s plans tomorrow.
With Boyd beginning one other must-win recreation, the Cubs obtained out to an early lead and Counsell put the hammer down. I didn’t love that he had Palencia as the primary reliever in once more, and in opposition to the identical part of lineup he’d confronted twice within the final two video games, however he breezed by way of an inning and a 3rd, after which it was matchup time. One little flourish I cherished was that Counsell saved alternating his lefties. This recreation, Pomeranz obtained Sal Frelick and switch-hitter Blake Perkins; the day gone by, he’d confronted Yelich and Brice Turang. Likewise, Thielbar’s assignments saved transferring round. That is what good managers do – make little switches like this that barely enhance their workforce’s possibilities with out significant draw back.
Talking of Pomeranz, he drew the beginning within the sequence finale, once more drawing Turang and Yelich because the lefties he matched up with. Contreras obtained him for a homer, however eh, what else was Counsell going do there? He didn’t have a starter. Rea adopted Pomeranz, and this time Counsell pulled off the opener gambit appropriately; Rea obtained the 5-8 hitters within the Milwaukee lineup twice, then Palencia got here in earlier than he’d should face the scary high of the order a second time. This was exhausting work for Palencia, going through the identical good hitters again and again, and I might have most well-liked a distinct reliever right here, however I’ll reduce Counsell just a little slack provided that it was nonetheless solely the fourth inning when Palencia entered; irrespective of who confronted the highest of the order first, one other reliever must take care of them later. You may’t utterly keep away from dangerous matchups, and I feel that Counsell appropriately deduced that he’d desire to present his greatest pitcher the toughest task, moderately than piling problem on a lesser arm.
The remainder of this recreation went mainly the way you’d anticipate – Thielbar, Kittredge, and Keller adopted Palencia in the most effective matchups Counsell may get. It didn’t matter; the Brewers restricted Chicago to a single run. However I nonetheless got here away from this sequence impressed by Counsell’s bullpen administration. Within the final three video games of the NLDS, he pulled out all of the stops, appropriately so, and the Cubs workers held the Brewers to 3 runs in Video games 3 and 5, and left them scoreless in Recreation 4. He did so with good matchups and a willingness to lean on his greatest pitchers, moderately than merely the fellows who obtained within the recreation first. Except for the Imanaga opener recreation, which I really didn’t look after, I don’t assume that the Cubs had the pitching to do something completely different than what Counsell did. That feels like a B to me, although should you needed to shade it up a half-grade or so I wouldn’t object.
Rob Thomson
Batting: D
It’s fairly exhausting to get a poor grade in my batting recaps; the one dangerous grades I give out are for one thing egregious. In years previous, that has included Stephen Vogt pinch-hitting with Austin Hedges, Torey Lovullo calling so many bunts I misplaced rely, Dusty Baker seeming to overlook that he had an excellent younger catcher as a substitute for his fading veteran. Thomson himself has executed effectively in these postmortems earlier than, largely as a result of he appears to know that one of the simplest ways to handle the Phillies is to get out of the best way and let their gaudy assortment of energy hitters go away the yard. Cue the foreshadowing…
Thomson began the sequence in opposition to the Dodgers together with his two slugging lefties batting second and third, with Brandon Marsh following fifth. Now, Marsh batted fifth so much this season, however that’s a dangerous proposition within the playoffs. The Phillies know that Marsh can’t hit lefties. They spent all yr making an attempt to guard him from lefties; he racked up 88 PA in opposition to them and 337 in opposition to righties in 2025, and that cut up is fairly constant all through his profession. He’s been abysmal in opposition to lefties. Even should you regress his efficiency closely again to the imply, he’s one of many worst left-on-left hitters within the recreation. Marsh’s place there made little or no sense to me, as a result of an opposing supervisor who introduced in a lefty reliever to face the scary bats may simply go away their man in in opposition to the overmatched Marsh.
Now, Thomson may all the time use a pinch-hitter, and he began the sequence with Nick Castellanos on the bench. There’s a gap on this plan, although: it’s a three-batter minimal, not a four-batter minimal, which signifies that even when Thomson subbed in Castellanos, the opposing supervisor would have the ability to pull their lefty for a righty. Issues obtained even worse when Harrison Bader was injured within the first recreation, selling Castellanos to the beginning lineup henceforth. Now Marsh’s place within the batting order was a brilliant purple goal for the Dodgers – however Thomson didn’t transfer him down to guard him from the lefty relievers that L.A. needed to make use of in opposition to Schwarber and Harper.
The Phillies didn’t actually have righty bench bats after Bader obtained injured. Why aren’t you hiding Marsh amongst some low-impact righties and daring the Dodgers to make use of a lefty reliever there as a substitute of in opposition to your greatest hitters? I really thought this was an terrible unforced error. In any case, Thomson tried his greatest to guard Marsh within the closing phases of the primary recreation, subbing in utility infielder Edmundo Sosa when Marsh drew Alex Vesia. That might presumably have been Castellanos’s spot if he hadn’t already changed Bader, so this specific substitution isn’t any knock on Thomson. I simply assume that he wanted to react extra to the altering workforce in entrance of him as a substitute of stubbornly leaving Marsh in a lineup spot that invited robust matchups.
In opposition to Blake Snell in Recreation 2, Thomson at the least moved Marsh right down to eighth – two thumbs up from me. Marsh even drew a stroll in opposition to Snell, solely to get picked off of first base later within the inning. In his protection, it’s not like he sees many lefty pickoff strikes. The sport proceeded uneventfully for essentially the most half; the principle change Thomson made was inserting his lefty bats when Snell departed. Then got here the fateful ninth, and one of many strangest choices I’ve seen in recent times.
With the Phillies trailing by three, Castellanos hit an enormous two-run double to place Philadelphia in enterprise. Man on second, nobody out, one-run deficit in opposition to a shaky Dodgers bullpen; this was their probability. However as a substitute of doing his regular factor and simply letting his good gamers attempt to make good performs, Thomson referred to as for a sacrifice bunt. You’ve in all probability seen a whole lot of replays of this one. Bryson Stott put down a fairly poor bunt and Max Muncy was charging all the best way; he had time to throw to Mookie Betts, wheeling over from brief to cowl third, and retire Castellanos.
Phillies legend Jimmy Rollins broke down the baserunning failure instantly after the sport, inserting the blame on Castellanos. He’s not incorrect; that was a extremely dangerous baserunning play, and a greater baserunner in all probability would have been secure there, both by getting a greater soar on the ball when Betts took off or by retreating to second base, which was left uncovered, when he realized he’d been crushed. However Castellanos isn’t an excellent baserunner! He hasn’t been one at any level in his profession, and he’s 33 now. Thomson didn’t name that bunt with no information of who was on base. He knew that he was making an attempt to advance Castellanos, a poor baserunner with middling footspeed. He knew that he was calling for a bunt from Stott, who has recorded six profitable sacrifices in additional than 3,000 skilled at-bats. He even saved the bunt on after the Dodgers confirmed that they had been keen to crash the plate with their total protection.
Even when the Phillies pulled this play off, they’d find yourself with lefty Max Kepler going through lefty strikeout specialist Alex Vesia with one out and runners on the corners (assuming an intentional stroll when Bader pinch-hit for Marsh); this was far from an automated tie recreation, and even when the Phillies tied it, the sport wasn’t going to finish. As an added “bonus,” donating an out made it much less doubtless that Philadelphia’s greatest hitters would get an opportunity on this inning, and realistically, you ought to be enjoying for a win right here, not a tie. Even a profitable sacrifice bunt right here would have lowered the percentages of the Phillies profitable the sport, per our WPA Inquirer; the precise outcome was far worse than that. Ouch.
In Recreation 3, a must-win, Thomson simply saved his opening recreation lineup and switched in Castellanos for Bader within the eight spot. That’s fairly bizarre to me – Castellanos performed in 147 video games this yr and by no means hit eighth as soon as – however no matter, perhaps he simply felt like sticking with the identical lineup card with as few alterations as attainable. Possibly he simply needed his right-handed hitting outfielder to bat eighth it doesn’t matter what. In any case, the Phillies obtained to Yoshinobu Yamamoto within the fourth inning for a 3 spot after which began the fifth trying so as to add on. Sadly, the Dodgers introduced in a lefty to face Kyle Schwarber and Bryce Harper, which (after an intentional stroll) led to Marsh going through Anthony Banda, a lefty specialist, with the bases loaded. Whoops, strikeout.
A scant two innings later, the Dodgers introduced in Clayton Kershaw to get Schwarber and Harper once more. It ended with an intentional stroll bringing Marsh to the plate in opposition to a lefty, and Marsh once more wasn’t as much as the duty, stranding two runners in a good recreation. Mercifully for Philly, the remainder of the lineup completely put it on Kershaw and put the sport away with a five-run eighth, although Marsh did get one other at-bat in opposition to him (leading to one other out). Even in the course of that gong present (two homers, a double, a stroll, loads of different exhausting hit balls), Thomson needed to put his mark on the sport; he referred to as for an additional sacrifice bunt from Stott, one of many uncommon outs Kershaw recorded. I simply don’t get it; there have been a number of bases-clearing hits nonetheless to come back on this inning, and Stott bats proper earlier than the massive boppers, in order that wasn’t precisely exhausting to forecast. Why are you giving outs away?
The fourth recreation was a low-offense slog, with troublesome visibility and good pitching muting every workforce’s offensive firepower. The Dodgers principally stayed away from their lefties, so Thomson principally stayed away from his bench, with either side solely blinking within the eleventh inning. On the hitting aspect, I assumed this recreation was fairly reduce and dry; Thomson simply wanted his membership to attain extra runs than they did.
Possibly I’m being too harsh on Thomson. He didn’t have a ton of choices on this sequence. However even with few choices, he made a sequence of very unusual strikes. That Castellanos/Stott play was baffling to me. Hanging Marsh out to dry repeatedly in opposition to lefty relievers? Why? The Phillies carried so many outfielders that even after Bader’s damage, that they had Otto Kemp and Weston Wilson each obtainable. Possibly retaining one batter in reserve to pinch-run for Bader made sense, however Thomson had a complete secure of quick runners to select from for that function. How did this finish in Marsh getting a ton of at-bats in spots that the Phillies simply didn’t set him up to reach? And the bunts! The bunts, with this workforce of plodders. These bunts weren’t making an attempt to advance Trea Turner and Stott, the workforce’s two wonderful baserunners. They had been transferring Castellanos round, and I can’t think about any supervisor in baseball thinks “let Nick Castellanos run the bases extra usually” is a key to success. (Effectively, tremendous, perhaps Philly’s opponents do.) In a sequence the place it felt like there weren’t many strikes to make, Thomson nonetheless managed to seek out a couple of dangerous ones.
Pitching: D-
Going through the Dodgers with out Zack Wheeler isn’t anybody’s concept of enjoyable. Within the first recreation, nevertheless, the Phillies had an amazing comfort prize in Cristopher Sánchez, who was among the many greatest starters in baseball this yr. Thomson handled him like an ace, letting him tangle with the Dodgers order a 3rd time by way of, which I feel was a terrific choice. Sadly for the Phillies, the pocket of lefty-killing righties in the course of the Dodgers lineup got here by way of when Tommy Edman singled after which Enrique Hernández adopted with a two-run double. Advantageous choice in my eyes, only a dangerous final result; the Phillies weren’t getting by way of this sequence with out yeoman’s work from Sánchez.
Thomson changed Sánchez with David Robertson, and right here Thomson misplaced me. I used to be truly shocked that Robertson made the playoff roster. He signed greater than midway by way of the season and regarded vastly diminished, like a 40-year-old who took six months off and couldn’t flip issues round. As a fellow 40-year-old, I sympathize – however then once more, I didn’t should enter the NLDS in a one-run recreation to face the Dodgers. Robertson retired one of many three batters he confronted and didn’t induce a single swing-and-miss; Thomson rushed out to get him as quickly as he was legally allowed. Matt Strahm entered with two on and no out, and nearly obtained out of the jam, however Teoscar Hernández tagged him for a three-run shot that ended the scoring. Thomson nonetheless used his best possible relievers the remainder of the best way, cognizant that beating the Dodgers could be very troublesome and that he wanted to grab each alternative. Orion Kerkering obtained the underside of the lineup after which Jhoan Duran obtained the highest to complete issues up.
Within the subsequent recreation, Jesús Luzardo regarded fairly good himself, and Thomson once more made the calculated choice to let him face the Dodgers lineup a 3rd time by way of. For the second time in a row, that didn’t work out nice; Teoscar Hernández and Freddie Freeman reached base to open the seventh inning, which meant Thomson needed to go to his bullpen with males on base and the sport on the road. This time, he introduced in Kerkering, with Robertson primarily consigned to the dustbin of historical past. The Dodgers simply beat a fairly good pitcher right here, and I don’t assume Thomson did something incorrect except for leaning closely on his greatest relievers in what felt like a misplaced trigger. Strahm, lefty specialist Tanner Banks, and Duran adopted with zeroes, establishing the Stott/Castellanos drama on the finish of this recreation. In some way, Duran had now confronted Shohei Ohtani and Will Smith twice every, with different nice Dodger hitters like Betts and Muncy additionally getting a have a look at him, despite the fact that the Phillies had been trailing by a number of runs within the ninth inning every time Duran entered. I get that it’s a brief sequence, however that doesn’t appear optimum. As soon as might be unavoidable. Each video games? That doesn’t seem to be an excellent plan to me.
The Phillies have one other nice starter in Ranger Suárez. Thomson elected to make use of Aaron Nola as an opener in entrance of him in Recreation 3, although, and made a giant deal to the tv announcers about how he’d give you the right spot to interchange Nola with Suárez. That spot was one way or the other in opposition to Edman, who has large profession platoon splits; he’s an influence hitter in opposition to lefties and a slap hitter when he switches sides of the plate to face righties. Batting on his most well-liked aspect, he launched a missile of a house run on Suárez’s get-me-over fastball to begin the outing.
I hate, hate, hated this choice. You may’t simply say “oh, it’s an opener” and have all of the matchups work. If the purpose of the opener was to let Suárez face batters who he’s higher in opposition to, why did he are available in for Edman particularly? The Phillies talked at size about how his intensive postseason expertise as each a reliever and starter let Thomson use him flexibly; why not have Nola face Edman after which usher in Suárez in opposition to a lefty? Why even trouble with the opener if all it will get you is an additional Suárez/Edman confrontation? That’s actively dangerous for you!
Anyway, Suárez was wonderful and by the point he departed the sport, the Phillies had blown issues open in opposition to Kershaw. Naturally, then, it was time for Kerkering, who was apparently each a high-leverage reliever and a mop-up man now. He confronted the highest of the Dodgers order – pitching for the third straight recreation – with an 8-1 lead. I really don’t perceive this one. You’re speculated to set your younger guys as much as succeed, not maintain giving your opponents free seems to be at your pitchers in unimportant spots.
Recreation 4 began out simple to handle; with the offenses flailing, Sánchez rolled by way of the Los Angeles lineup twice earlier than working right into a pinch of bother within the seventh, with two on and one out. Thomson went to Duran right here, and I utterly perceive why: If he was going to lose, he was going to lose together with his greatest man on the mound, and Duran is without doubt one of the greatest within the majors in a one-inning stint. However then Thomson determined to deliberately stroll an ice chilly Ohtani, loading the bases for Betts, in a one-run recreation.
Simply say these phrases to your self over and over. Load the bases… for Mookie Betts… in a one-run recreation. Betts has among the best batting eyes in baseball. Duran is way from wild, however a giant cause he limits walks is that his absurd splitter makes a whole lot of batters swing at it even when it’s not within the strike zone. Offense was at an excessive premium on this recreation, too, due to the twilight circumstances; it was clear proper from the beginning that Betts can be attempting to find a game-tying stroll as a substitute of making an attempt to beat among the best closers in baseball straight up.
I discovered this choice so surprising that I ran the numbers on it in depth. For the report, Duran has huge reverse splits, which doesn’t shock me given his nasty splitter. Betts is sort of completely even in opposition to lefties and righties. Ohtani hits righties higher than lefties, after all. Throw all that and the sport state after every attainable final result into my tough matchup software, and I get a 37.4% Dodgers probability of profitable earlier than the intentional stroll, and a 40.3% probability of profitable after the stroll. In the event you’re new to those articles, you may marvel what the massive deal is, however let me be clear: That’s an unlimited swing in win chance for a managerial choice. It’s bat-Ohtani-ninth ranges of dangerous, bunt-with-Aaron Choose degree dangerous.
I needed to make a couple of assumptions, so I wouldn’t be assured to the tenth of a share level or something, however this was an unlimited, terrible gaffe. Actually, it’s in all probability worse than my calculations. I simulate the prospect of a stroll based mostly on total talent degree for batters, pitchers, and league common, however should you inform actually Mookie Betts, a person who’s a celebrity regardless of his slight stature as a result of he’s simply so coordinated and good at making changes, {that a} stroll can tie the sport, he’s allowed to vary his conduct. He’s allowed to cease making an attempt to hit the ball exhausting and focus extra on seeing it late, and certainly, his two swings within the at-bat had been defensive. He was making an attempt to take a stroll; Duran threw 4 pitches exterior of the zone, and Betts took all of them. You simply can’t load the bases like that and provides the Dodgers a strategy to tie the sport with no hit. That doesn’t even take into account the truth that Ohtani was chilly as ice, Duran was in tremendous type, and nobody may purchase a success to save lots of their lives that evening. What on the earth was Thomson considering?
After Duran, beneath excessive duress, surrendered the tying run, Thomson let him pitch till he was too drained to proceed. Is smart to me! He’s their greatest reliever, in any case. Strahm then pitched a bridge inning – sticking with the great relievers – earlier than Luzardo obtained the tenth and a lot of the eleventh. This felt like a type of video games the place Luzardo was going to pitch till it ended – however when the Dodgers put runners on the corners with two outs, Thomson introduced in Kerkering, who had pitched in each recreation of the sequence already, to an enormous leverage spot. Kerkering walked the primary batter he confronted (it wasn’t significantly shut) after which dedicated an unlucky error to finish the sequence. I don’t blame him for it, although; on-field errors are inevitable. You’re by no means going to erase all of these. The bullpen administration on this recreation, although? That’s a better factor to scrub up, and I assumed Thomson’s choices wanted fairly a little bit of cleansing up. This yr’s playoffs have seen a whole lot of good administration thus far, however Thomson’s efficiency wasn’t as much as snuff. I’m not giving him an F, as a result of I feel he had some good instincts round leaving good starters within the recreation, however he made some errors that I discovered fairly surprising.