Much less Slappin’, Extra Whappin’ | FanGraphs Baseball

Rely me among the many multitudes who’ve been borderline obsessive about the emergence of Pete Crow-Armstrong as a famous person this season. I’m certain he’ll attain a saturation level ultimately the place hardcore followers get bored with him — it occurred to superhero motion pictures, and bacon, and Patrick Mahomes — however we’re not there but.

Each time I write about PCA, I revisit the central thesis: This can be a participant who’s ok to get by on his glove even when he doesn’t hit a lick. However out of nowhere, he’s become a authentic offensive menace. Nice athletes who play with a little bit aptitude, a little bit panache, a little bit pizzaz, are typically well-liked basically. The elite defensive middle fielder who finds a technique to contribute offensively might be my favourite place participant archetype; the extra I in contrast PCA to Lorenzo Cain, Jackie Bradley Jr., Enrique Bradfield Jr., Carlos Gómez… the extra I understood why I’d come to love him a lot.

In truth, let’s take a second to speak about Gómez, and his offensive breakout within the early 2010s.

Gómez was the prize younger participant who went from the Mets to the Twins within the Johan Santana commerce. The ebook on Gómez again then was velocity, velocity, velocity. He stole 12 bases in 58 video games as a 21-year-old rookie, and rapidly developed into an elite defender in middle discipline. However even after the Twins despatched him to Milwaukee for J.J. Hardy two seasons later (I am going on and on about it, however this man has such an enchanting commerce historical past), Gómez didn’t hit for both common or energy. Even with an especially restricted offensive recreation, he was a median participant, however nothing extra.

Then, sooner or later, Gómez wakened and realized that he was 6-foot-3 and 220 kilos. He didn’t have to only ground-and-pound to benefit from his velocity; he might hit the ball within the air as nicely. The end result: batting averages within the .280s and 20-plus homers a 12 months. And since nothing concerning the new method prevented Gómez from taking part in protection or stealing bases, he did all of that whereas persevering with to steal 30-plus bases a 12 months. The end result: 6.7 WAR in 147 video games in 2013, and 5.7 WAR in 148 video games in 2014.

Gómez’s emergence set in movement a sequence of occasions that culminated in one among my favourite clubhouse anecdotes of the 2010s. Not lengthy after the Brewers signed their star outfielder to a three-year, $24 million contract, Sports activities Illustrated author Luke Winn profiled Gómez and included the next:

[Ryan Braun] says that lately Gómez knowledgeable him, whereas holding a plate stuffed with kiwi, that the fruit had 3 times as a lot potassium as bananas. “I requested him how he heard it,” Braun says. “He advised me, now that he’s rich, he’s been Googling rich-people conversations so he is aware of what to speak to rich individuals about, and he got here throughout that information.”

Again to Crow-Armstrong: In 2024, he had a GB/FB ratio of 0.88, which was hardly a Nellie Fox tribute act to start with. This 12 months, his GB/FB ratio is 0.48. The man with 97th-percentile dash velocity is placing the ball within the air extra typically than any certified hitter aside from Cal Raleigh, who’s so sluggish any try and quantify his dash velocity defies the bounds of latest arithmetic.

It received me considering: Who’s subsequent? Which quick guys are pigeonholing themselves right into a groundball-heavy method, and thus denying themselves the pleasures of the profitable and kiwi-filled dinger-bashing way of life?

I rustled up this little chart on Baseball Savant. As you’ll be able to see, there’s no correlation between dash velocity and groundball fee. What I need to see is whether or not anybody could be moved from the highest proper quadrant of the graph to the underside proper.

A few of these instances are fairly nicely documented. Like, everyone knows Christian Yelich and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. each hit the ball on the bottom an excessive amount of. So out of all certified hitters, I took those that have been not less than one customary deviation above the imply in each dash velocity and groundball fee. Then I fiddled with the factors a little bit as a result of I wished to get Dylan Crews into the pattern. (One customary deviation above the imply for GB% was 48.6%, which left Crews 4 tenths shy of constructing this desk. Additionally: This desk makes use of Savant’s batted ball kind classification; our numbers are barely totally different, however this train isn’t scientifically rigorous sufficient to separate hairs over.)

Let’s dive into this set of 9 gamers. Tatis, Rodríguez, and Henderson go into the “don’t mess with what’s working” group. And I say that although Rodríguez and Henderson are, broadly talking, having barely disappointing offensive seasons. I’m certain they’d like to hit extra doubles and residential runs, however Rodríguez is placing up mainly the identical wRC+ he did final 12 months regardless of some appalling batted ball luck, whereas Henderson’s points are quite a few.

There’s nowhere to go however down after an 8.0 WAR season, I suppose, however Henderson, along with not squaring the ball up as nicely, is whiffing extra, chasing extra, placing out extra… all of the unhealthy stuff. His woes require their very own weblog submit, and even then — he’s received a 121 wRC+ as a shortstop. That’s nonetheless actually good by any affordable customary.

Frelick has sixth-percentile bat velocity and a Twelfth-percentile HardHit%; I don’t suppose there’s a lot untapped energy there.

And till I dug a little bit, I might’ve mentioned the identical factor about Rafaela and Turang. Eight-year contract or no, Rafaela is working out of rope on the main league degree for 2 causes: First, he’s been completely horrible on the plate. Second, the Purple Sox are calling up shiny place participant prospects sooner than they’ll clear spots within the lineup. As for Turang, I might’ve had him lined up as a Geraldo Perdomo-type low-bat-speed, high-contact man, with a plus-plus baserunning instrument.

However look, they’re each placing higher swings on the ball this season.

Turang is getting outcomes; Rafaela has been hampered by some unhealthy batted ball luck and, extra worryingly, the truth that he’ll nonetheless swing at nearly something that is available in his course.

That leaves Holliday, de la Cruz, and Crews.

After a nightmarish rookie season, I’m largely relieved Vacation is displaying any indicators of life in any respect. The previous no. 1 general decide has almost doubled his wRC+ and reduce his strikeout fee by a 3rd. Even along with his spectacular background, Holliday is an average-over-power hitter who topped out at 12 dwelling runs within the minor leagues. He’s nonetheless so younger I’d count on him so as to add energy as he fills out, however his batted ball profile suggests which may simply result in harder-hit grounders, not dwelling runs.

Right here’s a quantity you won’t count on: de la Cruz grounded into 12 double performs final 12 months. That’s in no way a league-leading determine, but it surely’s a reasonably large quantity. It’s as many as Raleigh and Brent Rooker hit into mixed, and Elly can run from dwelling to first in about 4 strides.

Why? As a result of hitting the ball arduous on the bottom could be perilous. If the ball doesn’t get by the infield, it simply will get to the fielder sooner. That provides the infielder extra time to document the out — or typically each outs.

EDLC (I discover, as with PCA, that having the ability to go by one’s initials is a boon for a budding younger athlete) is definitely hitting the ball on the bottom extra this 12 months than at any level in his main league profession. Worse, this propensity for grounders is coming on the expense of line drives; his LD% has dropped from 20.7% in 2024 to 10.7% this season.

Then there’s Crews, at which level I noticed the folly of this train. In fact Crews ought to hit the ball within the air extra. His groundball fee was just about the one flaw anybody present in his recreation when he was a three-year starter for some of the extremely scrutinized novice groups within the nation. He fell — “fell” — from first to second within the draft, behind his LSU teammate Paul Skenes, largely due to signability issues, however Crews’ groundball fee received talked about very like Skenes’ fastball form: not ideally suited, however pointing it out looks like nitpicking, and perhaps the remainder of the package deal is so good it gained’t matter.

It hasn’t for Skenes; it has for Crews. C’est la vie.

I went on the lookout for the subsequent Carlos Gómez and got here out with three of probably the most completely researched and picked-over prospects within the historical past {of professional} sports activities. Everybody is aware of they may stand to place the ball within the air extra.

This isn’t the top of the elevate-and-celebrate motion, however I do suppose it’s hit a useless finish by way of being low-hanging fruit in participant improvement. Statcast information doesn’t return all that far, however within the first 12 months of the pattern, 2015, 16 out of 142 certified hitters had a dash velocity of 28.46 ft/sec or higher, and a GB% of 48.0% or greater. This 12 months, as you’ve seen, these endpoints snag simply 9 certified hitters out of 168.

In a decade, this has gone from the sort of perception that would change a 30-year-old’s profession to a fundamental technical competency for each 16-year-old who’s ever seen a non-public hitting coach. Ten years doesn’t seem to be a very long time, however an innovation that profitable will get adopted, copied, and constructed upon in a short time. It took much less time than that to get from Chuck Berry to the Beatles. Now we’re within the age of rock and roll.