Heading into the 12 months, everybody thought this may be the season that Shohei Ohtani, rehabbing from elbow surgical procedure and DHing solely, stepped apart and yielded MVP to another person earlier than resuming his place because the de facto favourite for the award in 2025. As an alternative, Ohtani determined to make a run on the first ever 50-homer, 50-steal season. The opposite major competitor for NL MVP is Francisco Lindor, who isn’t chasing any statistical milestones and performs for a group whose most attention-grabbing narratives contain an amorphous quick meals mascot, the musical endeavors of a part-time utility infielder, and the failure to increase Pete Alonso. And but, Lindor’s place atop the NL WAR leaderboard calls for consideration.
The marginal distinction between Lindor and Ohtani’s WAR totals (7.4 and seven.0, respectively, on the time of this writing) creates a digital tie to be damaged based mostly on the private convictions of voters and anybody else with an opinion and an web connection. For many, the selection between the 2 distills down as to whether Ohtani’s 50/50 chase overrides his DH-only standing. I’m not right here to disparage Ohtani for not enjoying protection, however for those who discover that disqualifying for MVP recognition, I really feel that. Then once more, WAR features a positional adjustment that does ding Ohtani with a major deduction for not taking the sphere, and he’s nonetheless been holding tempo with Lindor on the worth entrance anyway, so there’s not way more evaluation to do there.
As an alternative, I wish to discover how Ohtani’s one-dimensional position interacts with the worth of a roster spot and the restrictions that it locations on how Los Angeles constructs and deploys the remainder of its roster. In a two-way Ohtani season, he brings super worth to a person roster spot as a frontline starter and an elite hitter who takes 600 or so plate appearances. However this 12 months he contributes solely as an offensive participant.
In the meantime, the 2024 Dodgers protection kicked off the season by declaring Mookie Betts a beginning shortstop, and formally shifting on from the notion that Gavin Lux would take over the place. Shifting Betts to the infield means nobody has began greater than 50 video games in proper subject for the Dodgers up to now this season. Probably the most constant presence within the outfield has been Teoscar Hernández with 94 video games began in left and 49 in proper, the place between the 2 he’s gathered -12.5 defensive runs above common. 5 Dodgers have performed at the very least 20 defensive innings at three or extra completely different positions; Enrique Hernández has performed each place however proper subject and catcher. Altogether, Los Angeles has struggled to subject a constant protection, forcing a lot of its gamers to be jacks of all trades but masters of none. Between the inconsistent roles and lackluster defensive expertise at a number of positions, the Dodgers clock in beneath common by way of each OAA and FRV.
The roster gymnastics required to subject a minimally competent defender at every place dominoes into circumstances the place hitters with distinct platoon splits discover themselves in suboptimal matchups. Early within the season when nonetheless working below their supposed plan for the season, it was clear the Dodgers most well-liked that Lux, Jason Heyward, and James Outman begin solely towards right-handed pitchers, with Enrique Hernández, Chris Taylor, and Miguel Rojas primarily beginning towards lefties. However with Betts, Rojas, and Max Muncy lacking chunks of time all through the season on account of accidents, Plan A has been tough to keep up.
After selecting to let Corey Seager and Trea Turner depart as free brokers in consecutive offseasons, it’s arduous to not marvel what the Dodgers may seem like with a participant of Seager or Turner’s caliber at shortstop and Betts stabilizing the outfield as a substitute of studying to play infield. Enter Francisco Lindor. What if Ohtani’s DH-only roster spot had been occupied as a substitute by Lindor? In a vacuum their value-add to a group is analogous, however within the context of a league with restricted roster spots and a group in want of defenders, would Lindor be extra precious to the Dodgers than Ohtani?
An apparent caveat earlier than we proceed, this thought experiment applies solely to the 2024 season. The Dodgers knowingly made a short-term tradeoff in favor of a long-term payout, and I’m certain they haven’t wavered on that call, whilst they submitted the paperwork to accumulate the likes of Nick Ahmed, Amed Rosario, and Cavan Biggio. This hypothetical is only to discover the worth of roster spots and participant versatility, to not recommend that the Dodgers shouldn’t have signed Shohei freaking Ohtani.
For the primary 148 video games of the Dodgers’ season — heading into this previous weekend — I went by each beginning defensive alignment and penciled in Lindor at shortstop. Then based mostly on the handedness of the opposing pitcher, reorganized the remainder of the protection accordingly and changed Ohtani at DH. Usually talking, this meant shifting Betts to proper subject (earlier than the Dodgers made that transfer themselves after he returned from the IL in August) or sliding Rojas and his above-average protection over to second, letting Lux DH versus righty pitching, and getting each Teoscar Hernández and Austin Barnes some DH alternatives towards lefties. We’ll get extra into the “why” behind these choices shortly, however first let’s take a big-picture have a look at how this realignment would’ve impacted every participant’s WAR totals.
On this realignment, Rojas and Barnes see a big bump by advantage of elevated enjoying time, whereas gamers like Andy Pages, Enrique Hernández, and Outman profit from getting a bigger share of their plate appearances in advantageous platoon matchups. In the meantime, the bump for gamers like Betts and Lux comes from optimizing their defensive output. For Betts, which means extra time in proper subject, his strongest place; for Lux, much less time enjoying any protection in any respect. (His play at second has been beneath common relative to others on the place, however roughly common total as soon as the positional adjustment is included.) The declines in WAR correspond solely to diminished enjoying time.
Summing up the projected WAR totals and evaluating to the group’s precise WAR reveals a 3.0 WAR enhance total when including Lindor and subtracting Ohtani. The most important features come on the defensive facet of the ball (see beneath), the place shifting Lux off second base in favor of Rojas, including a full season of Lindor at brief, and getting extra innings from Betts in proper result in an enchancment of virtually 19 defensive runs above common (together with all positional changes). On condition that the run setting this 12 months units the bar at roughly 9.7 runs per win, the development on protection mainly accounts for two-thirds of the rise in group WAR.
The person decreases in defensive manufacturing consequence from gamers getting diminished enjoying time, with the lone exception being Teoscar Hernández, who sees a bit extra time in left subject, the place he isn’t a constructive contributor. Betts and Rojas spend extra innings at positions the place they’re proficient, whereas Enrique Hernández and Taylor see much less enjoying time at positions the place they aren’t.
However defensive enhancements apart, one may nonetheless count on the offense to take a success with out Ohtani. Lindor is an above-average hitter, however he’s not Ohtani. But, with Lindor within the fold, it’s doable to make sufficient enhancements on the margins to shut the hole between Lindor’s 136 wRC+ and Ohtani’s 168 wRC+. The chart beneath highlights the variations in particular person participant output, indicating that among the enchancment outcomes from addition by subtraction. Giving much less total enjoying time to Outman and the fringier gamers on the roster corresponding to Ahmed, Taylor Trammell, Rosario, and Biggio helps, as does devoting extra plate appearances to extra productive gamers like Barnes and Rojas. One other plus is curating enjoying time to gamers’ platoon splits. Pages, Lux, and Enrique Hernández all see their plate-appearance ratio tilt towards their most well-liked pitcher-handedness matchups, and getting some strategic days off for Teoscar Hernández versus righties boosts his numbers a bit.
Barnes is price digging into particularly, as he advantages from the elevated enjoying time, which maximizes his significantly robust efficiency towards lefty pitching this 12 months (145 wRC+). Positive, this projection is perhaps overly optimistic; this season Barnes has solely 43 plate appearances versus lefties, working the chance of representing extra noise than sign. His profession mark towards lefties is nearer to common, however the platoon cut up does nonetheless persist, and since this train completely covers 2024, it feels justified to make use of this 12 months’s mark. Even when his efficiency had been to dip over a bigger pattern, it could have a protracted option to go for Barnes to cease being a productive alternative for about an additional 80 plate appearances towards lefties.
Admittedly, this isn’t an ideal train. Swapping gamers out and in and assuming they’ll proceed to keep up their manufacturing in barely completely different contexts whereas getting extra enjoying time leaves loads of room for error. These adjustments work together with one another and different exterior elements in methods which are tough to account for. However numbers apart, one can have a look at issues from a extra strictly baseball perspective and see the advantages of granting gamers extra constant roles and crafting these roles to incorporate extra of what they’re finest at doing as a substitute of simply what they’re able to doing. And although it’s easy responsible the suboptimal defensive alignments and lineup oddities on Ohtani’s not enjoying protection, the group’s ratio of position gamers to lineup mainstays isn’t actually what you’d count on from a powerhouse just like the Dodgers. A roster with Enrique Hernández, Taylor, Heyward, Rojas, Vargas, Outman, and Lux creates a tricky puzzle to piece collectively, one which turns into barely simpler with that further lineup spot to make use of. Granted gamers like Lux and Outman weren’t regarded as position gamers within the early going, nevertheless it’s on groups to plan for these contingencies. A group with one or two extra constantly common or barely above-average gamers would haven’t any challenge working round a DH-only season of Ohtani.
Moreover, Los Angeles’ secure of position gamers formed its strategy on the commerce deadline. Because the Dodgers managed accidents to Betts, Rojas, and Muncy, their wants spanned your entire diamond. There was no single-player or single-position answer. The Dodgers wanted Ahmed, Edman, Rosario, and Kevin Kiermaier to plug holes. With Lindor, perhaps they’d nonetheless get a kind of gamers as a depth piece, however they’d be capable to focus their time and deadline assets on getting one impression outfielder (say Jazz Chisholm Jr., Jesse Winker, or Randy Arozarena) price a win or two on their very own, as a substitute of setting out a whole set of replacement-level Tupperware to account for a leaky protection. Then, supervisor Dave Roberts may extra totally maximize the energy of his depth items to plug any remaining holes, rising their capacity to contribute constructive worth, as we’ve already seen demonstrated.
So regardless that the strategy isn’t completely exact, and we are able to’t actually start to calculate the cascading impacts on the commerce deadline and the way higher consistency in enjoying time and roles affect efficiency, an estimated three-win surplus isn’t a small quantity within the context of a playoff race. The Dodgers’ division lead over the Padres at the moment sits at 3.5 video games and would really feel a lot safer at 5 – 6 video games. Maybe extra importantly, the Dodgers are solely two video games forward of the Brewers for the second first-round bye. As accidents proceed to chew the Los Angeles rotation, and the group works to get one or two of its sidelined pitchers wholesome and constructed again up earlier than the postseason, the additional time for relaxation and rehab, coupled with fewer playoff innings to cowl total, is a luxurious it desperately wants.
If there’s one factor to remove from this text, it’s that gamers present extra worth to their groups than what’s mirrored of their WAR totals, particularly those that do a number of issues effectively. That’s why, in a 12 months when the Dodgers function extra one-dimensional position gamers on the similar time that Ohtani is relegated to DH-only duties, we are able to conclude that Lindor can be extra precious to this season’s group than Ohtani. Even so, I can’t assist however marvel that Ohtani is so good at hitting that not solely does he make up for his personal lack of defensive contributions, however he additionally does sufficient to nearly solely account for the damaging defensive contributions of his teammates who’re pressured to take the sphere as a result of the DH spot is occupied. That’s so spectacular.
So don’t take this as an indictment of the Dodgers’ roster building, however relatively as an object lesson on the worth of a roster spot, the alternative ways wherein that worth is accrued, and the way the methods completely different gamers accrue worth work together with each other once they’re on the identical group. Not each participant must be a Lindor, and most gamers can’t be an Ohtani, however there are methods to purposefully construct an efficient roster round both sort of participant and each sort in between.
And for those who got here to this text hoping for a definitive tackle who ought to win the NL MVP, I’m sorry I don’t have one for you. However assuming Lindor’s again challenge doesn’t pressure him to overlook important time, the choice deserves to be a tough one if we’re contemplating all sources of worth.