Possibly you’ve heard, however the Diamondbacks bunted lots this postseason. I’m underselling it, in fact — you positively heard it. Possibly you noticed Michael Baumann’s blow-by-blow recap of all of the bunts. Possibly you examine Evan Longoria’s freelancing. Possibly you learn Patrick Dubuque’s breakdown of groups attempting to repeat Arizona. Simply yesterday, Russell Carleton truly went via all the maths of which bunts are getting extra well-liked league-wide in a usually wonderful article. Possibly you learn any of the numerous different takes on it. However I’ve a distinct view. I feel the Diamondbacks are being misrepresented. I feel that it was extra a case of some opportunistic bunters than a staff coverage, and that their bunts didn’t alter the course of their offensive future a lot in any respect.
You’ve certainly heard, in all that recounting, that the Diamondbacks led the majors in sacrifice bunts this yr. It’s true! Additionally they bunted lots – both 68 or 69 instances, relying on which bunt classification database you need to use. Corbin Carroll and Geraldo Perdomo mixed to bunt 36 instances this common season. Perdomo was second within the majors in bunt makes an attempt; Carroll was within the high 15.
These two bunted with markedly totally different goals. Carroll was nearly completely attempting to bunt for successful when he laid one down, or no less than discover a spot the place reaching base was considerably seemingly and a sacrifice was an excellent fallback choice. I watched each one in all his bunts; he by no means squared to bunt till after the pitcher began his movement. Carroll wasn’t notably efficient as a bunter, although. He singled on three of his first six bunt makes an attempt this season, however after defenses adjusted to him, he made outs on his final seven. Right here’s his greatest bunt, an excellent mixture of base/out state and placement:
The protection wasn’t nice there; Carlos Santana pinched in, however with a double play accessible and a runner on third, there was nobody behind him to cowl first. Even when Carroll had bunted into an on the market, although, it was a great place to attempt it, with a runner who may rating and one other runner who may advance.
That’s what you count on from a hitter nearly as good as Carroll. When he’s bunting, you’d hope it’s in a great place for a bunt, one the place the rewards are excessive and the possibilities of getting on base are no less than affordable. Only one downside: Carroll didn’t make the online package deal work. He was 3-for-13 turning his bunt makes an attempt into singles and produced adverse WPA on steadiness. I like utilizing WPA to investigate bunts, as a result of it offers the hitter some credit score for a profitable sacrifice by taking context into consideration. However even with that profit, Carroll’s bunting didn’t work out for him. He appeared to take that lesson to coronary heart; after getting bunt loopy in June and July (eight makes an attempt), he bunted solely twice in August and as soon as in September. Even within the playoffs, he solely laid down two bunts, and I feel they had been each affordable: a bases-empty try at successful, and a savvy insurance coverage run bunt, with a runner on second and nobody out whereas the D-backs held a four-run lead.
I don’t suppose you may have a look at Carroll’s recreation and say that he’s bringing sacrifice bunts again. He’s clearly attempting to bunt for successful each time he bunts, and once more, that makes excellent sense. If he had been merely laying down a sacrifice, it could be a horrible choice; taking the bat out of Carroll’s palms is the very last thing the Diamondbacks need.
Perdomo’s scenario is totally different. He isn’t nearly as good of a hitter as Carroll, for one factor, and the perfect Arizona bats come up after him within the lineup. Through the common season, he bunted early and sometimes. Right here’s one mind-set about it: In bunt conditions, with no less than one runner on base and fewer than two outs, Carroll bunted 4.3% of the time. That’s excessive – forty third within the league amongst hitters with 50 bunt conditions – nevertheless it’s near what I’d count on for somebody along with his velocity and batting ability. Perdomo bunted 12.8% of the time, triple the speed.
Nobody who confronted as many bunt conditions as Perdomo bunted as continuously. The one hitters who bunted extra continuously had been unhealthy: Austin Hedges, Johan Rojas, Zach Remillard, Martín Maldonado, and Nick Allen. Perdomo behaved roughly like a light-hitting catcher. I feel his offensive ability set is healthier than that, however I additionally suppose it’s worse than Carroll’s, so it is smart that he’d bunt extra continuously.
Actually, Perdomo has completed this since reaching the majors. He bunted simply as continuously in 2021 and 2022. Groups are more and more attempting to take it away, and so they’ve succeeded; he solely transformed 4 bunts into singles in 2023, a reasonably depressing price. To make the maths work in the long term, notably for those who’re not bunting in a tie recreation within the late innings, you might want to convert your bunt right into a single round 30% of the time. It varies primarily based on who’s on base, who’s up subsequent, and every kind of things like that, however one third or so is a superb rule of thumb. Perdomo was wildly wanting that! He bunted 19 instances in conditions the place he was making that actual tradeoff and solely reached base on 4 of them (three singles and a profitable squeeze play).
Give credit score to Perdomo for one factor, although: he picked his spots effectively. Sacrifice bunts aren’t at all times unhealthy selections, even when they finish in an out. Bunting to maneuver two runners over late in a tie recreation will increase your possibilities of profitable for those who begin with nobody out, for instance. One other good rule of bunting: advancing the runner on first is much less helpful than advancing the runner on second. The perfect bunts put a runner on third with just one out. As that great Carleton article factors out, the very greatest bunts put a runner on third with just one out and are completed by poor hitters. That’s why Perdomo was such a frequent bunter, and why I’m so skeptical of the Carroll bunts. Total, Perdomo misplaced WPA by bunting, however not a ton; he made up for his inefficiency at reaching base by choosing good spots basically. With good hitters batting after him, it’s seemingly that WPA barely understated his contribution, even.
I’ve targeted on these two gamers as a result of they had been the one playoff contributors who had been frequent bunters this season. Jake McCarthy, Jose Herrera, and Josh Rojas had been third via fifth, respectively, on the staff in common season bunts put in play. Rojas departed the staff in a commerce this July, McCarthy missed the playoffs with damage, and Herrera performed sparingly in aid of Gabriel Moreno. It’s probably not honest to say that the Diamondbacks, as constructed in October, had been constructed from high to backside for sacrifice bunts. It could be extra correct to say that Perdomo bunts a ton, and that Carroll went for his justifiable share of sneak assaults.
That actual development continued within the playoffs, and to not Perdomo’s profit. His greatest bunts within the common season got here in no-lose conditions: shut and late video games the place sacrificing and reaching had been each optimistic outcomes. Within the playoffs, he didn’t try a single bunt in a tie recreation. He solely tried two bunts within the eighth inning or later, and each instances the Diamondbacks already had a multi-run lead, which makes the entire play much less essential. However he bunted within the second, third, and fifth innings, and every one was an out. Don’t quit outs when there’s a whole lot of recreation left to be performed:
Don’t quit outs whenever you’re trailing:
Particularly don’t quit outs whenever you’re trailing for those who solely advance a single runner:
These bunts are unhealthy. Bunting whenever you’re down is unhealthy! The maths is simple to work out. In case you’re trailing by one, the primary and second runs are roughly equally essential. The primary will get you from 0% to 50% to win, and the second from 50% to 100%, assuming no additional scoring. In a tie recreation, the primary run is way extra invaluable than the second. Performs that make the second run much less prone to rating are completely acceptable whenever you’re tied, and a catastrophe whenever you’re behind.
Within the common season, Perdomo acted in response to that truism. He bunted seven instances in tie video games, and solely 4 when the staff was trailing. Carroll behaved equally; he had 5 bunts in tie video games and solely 4 when Arizona was behind. However Perdomo bunted twice whereas trailing within the playoffs, and by no means in a tie recreation. Carroll no less than solely bunted with a lead – high quality, however much less thrilling than bunting with a tie. It’s partially as a result of he by no means had an opportunity, however for probably the most half, the staff merely didn’t decide good spots to bunt.
Of the staff’s 12 playoff bunts, Perdomo and Carroll accounted for eight. The others had been largely improvised selections, which labored to various levels. Ketel Marte dropped a sneak bunt single on the Dodgers that was by no means near being an out:
That’s wonderful, as a result of it was a base hit. You shouldn’t bunt for a sacrifice early within the recreation, as our subsequent contestant did. Even with runners on first and second and nobody out, it’s a barely adverse win expectancy play. That may be mitigated for those who’re a foul hitter and the batters developing after you might be significantly better. However Gabriel Moreno is an effective hitter, so this clear sacrifice was a poor choice:
This bunt by Evan Longoria was worse:
Certain, he superior the runner to second with just one out, however giving up an out to take action isn’t an excellent commerce, notably with the underside of the lineup due up subsequent. And Longoria had mainly no shot of being secure at first, so the maths was by no means going to work out. The one different bunt was Lourdes Gurriel Jr. dropping one down with a three-run lead within the eighth, which is a mediocre choice in a low-leverage spot.
The weirdest a part of all of this bunt math? All these postseason bunts did little or no to maneuver the needle when it got here to profitable or shedding video games. All these bunts, the unhealthy and the nice collectively, mixed for a grand complete of -0.05 WPA, or 5% of a win. To be honest, Marte’s single was value optimistic 5% all by itself, whereas the remainder of the bunts value the staff fairly a bit, however that’s how bunting works. In case you by no means landed a single, it could be a horrible choice. The occasional successes make up for the bigger set of small losses.
Possibly you don’t imagine that WPA does an excellent job of capturing the impact of those bunts, so let me pitch it to you a distinct means. A lot of the Diamondbacks’ bunts didn’t assist them rating. Seven of their bunts occurred in innings the place they didn’t rating a single run. One other 4 bunts got here in innings the place a batter who got here to the plate after the bunter scored. In different phrases, the bases had been getting cleared a method or one other; the development from bunting didn’t produce any runs. In precisely one occasion – Perdomo’s seventh-inning sacrifice in Recreation 2 of the World Collection – a bunt led to a run that may not have in any other case scored if the next performs had nonetheless occurred in sequence.
Even stranger, all that common season bunting didn’t truly assist the Diamondbacks out a lot. They gained a fraction of a win, roughly 10% of 1, throughout all of their common season bunts. They completed precisely fifteenth in baseball by that metric. Their worst bunter, by way of combination WPA misplaced? That’d be Perdomo, who value the staff 22% of a win along with his bunts. Carroll was second with -0.19 WPA, or 19% of a win. Actually, McCarthy added half a win, with the overwhelming majority coming because of a single bunt that came about within the fourth recreation of the season. For all of the hullabaloo, Arizona’s bunting merely didn’t quantity to a lot.
The perfect bunting staff this yr, per WPA, was truly the Royals. They didn’t bunt notably typically – 36 instances, 14th within the league. The Rays had been nipping at their heels, and so they solely bunted 26 instances. Each groups did so effectively as a result of they picked their spots and used the component of shock. Actually, all of the bunting within the majors mixed didn’t quantity to a lot. It sounds unusual, nevertheless it is smart for those who cease to consider it. The entire level of a bunt is that it reduces variance; it removes the highest finish of nice outcomes but in addition, in concept, the underside finish of abysmal outcomes. Nothing a couple of bunt is game-breaking.
This most likely nonetheless isn’t convincing to individuals who love what the Diamondbacks had been doing in October. Some individuals favor that model of baseball, no matter final result. I’d simply say this in response: The Diamondbacks didn’t generate the vast majority of their runs by bunting, both within the common season or the playoffs. They generated negligible win worth by bunting, in each the common season and the playoffs. And earlier than you level to their bunting as a purpose that they outperformed their run differential, think about this: They batted .245/.315/.390 in low-leverage conditions and .275/.362/.460 in high-leverage conditions. In case you may bottle that up and replicate it, you’d be onto one thing, however the bunts weren’t the key sauce.
I want I had extra takeaways for you. I want that totally different kinds of play affected outcomes extra. One way or the other, although, it doesn’t appear to work that means. The Diamondbacks did some issues in a different way. However these issues simply didn’t matter that a lot ultimately – and for probably the most half, in truth, Perdomo was a one-man bunting revolution. He bunted greater than six totally different groups. He and Carroll mixed would have completed in a tie for thirteenth. The 2 of them mixed for eight of the 26 complete playoff bunts. The story right here wasn’t that the Diamondbacks discovered a brand new solution to play baseball; it’s that one in all their gamers bunted a ton with out nice impact in both course.