When the Cubs signed Seiya Suzuki earlier than the 2022 season, it was a part of a daring technique to speed up their return to competition. They weren’t fairly prepared for his or her shut up that 12 months, however the normal plan was fairly clear: add a couple of items then, tack on extra the next season, and purpose for a great staff sooner quite than later.
Excellent news! That plan has labored. The Cubs are in playoff place in mid-September, similar to they drew it up. They supplemented 2022’s free company exploits with a double dip final offseason. Cody Bellinger and Dansby Swanson have been proper on the forefront of the cost, although Swanson has slumped lately. However for a bit, it appeared like Suzuki may not be part of Chicago’s plans.
He coasted by means of 2022, a stable righty bat however hardly among the finest hitters within the league. He began off this season in a funk, handled accidents, and eventually received benched in early August. It was an extended fall for somebody so heralded, however truthfully, you possibly can see what the Cubs had been considering. By means of that time within the 12 months, Suzuki was batting .249/.328/.389, good for a 96 wRC+, and hanging out a worrisome 25.3% of the time. He’d slumped because the 12 months wore on, besides; he had a wRC+ of 59 within the months of June and July.
To place it mildly, it looks like he figured one thing out. Suzuki returned to the lineup on a full-time foundation on August 9, and he’s been among the finest hitters in baseball since then. His wRC+ over that span is 197. He’s hanging out simply 16.1% of the time. He’s cracked seven homers in 118 plate appearances, and he’s doing a little bit little bit of every part apart from that. He’s hitting line drives all over, and hitting for energy and common. That is the Suzuki everybody hoped to see when he came to visit from NPB final 12 months.
What modified? I believe David Ross recognized it effectively in speaking about his transient benching (Ross didn’t name it that, for what it’s price, however it’s fairly clear that he was getting greater than only a few relaxation days). “He’s simply in between. If he’s wanting heater, they throw him a slider,” he instructed The Athletic’s Sahadev Sharma. The message from the Cubs was clear and constant. “Generally these guys get into making an attempt to play cat-and-mouse with the pitcher a little bit an excessive amount of,” hitting coach Dustin Kelly recognized, pointing to the identical factor.
That’s a type of traditional baseballisms that I’m all the time a little bit bit skeptical of. That’s what hitting is! They may throw you one thing quick, or they may throw you one thing gradual. If you happen to can’t establish them, that feels to me much less like being in between and extra like not hitting effectively. However there’s a time-honored resolution, which Kelly was fast to level out in the identical interview. You simply sit on one in every of two speeds and modify in the event you’re fallacious. Straightforward peasy.
There’s only one drawback with that naive resolution: it’s not clear which one Suzuki was having bother with specifically. Irrespective of the way you break pitches down, he wasn’t displaying any apparent plate self-discipline holes whilst he slumped. Even at his worst, he wasn’t lacking any class of pitch at a very elevated fee in comparison with 2022:
Swing and Miss by Pitch Sort
| Sort | 2022 SwStr% | 2023 SwStr% | 2022 Whiff% | 2023 Whiff% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fastball | 7.0% | 8.3% | 17.6% | 20.5% |
| Breaking | 11.4% | 9.1% | 31.8% | 23.8% |
| Offspeed | 13.7% | 13.0% | 28.4% | 31.9% |
If there’s something to notice, it’s a barely elevated whiff fee on fastballs. However that’s fairly marginal, not way more than a rounding error. No, the issue got here when Suzuki made contact. The entire level of hitting is to hit the ball exhausting and within the air. You’d additionally favor to drag it; batted ball speeds have a tendency increased on the pull facet, principally as a result of the bat is transferring at its quickest because it will get out in entrance of the plate, and that’s the place you must meet the ball to drag it. However actually, you need to hit it exhausting and within the air first, and every part else is a bonus.
That’s what everybody anticipated Suzuki to do when he got here to the most important leagues. He was a persistently glorious masher in Japan, with a profession .570 slugging proportion. However within the States (and, superb, sometimes Toronto), he merely didn’t recapture that kind. By means of his benching, he’d been hitting roughly 1 / 4 of his batted balls exhausting and within the air, barely lower than the most important league common. He’d managed to hit exhausting, pulled contact within the air on solely about 7.5% of his batted balls, meaningfully lower than the ten% league common. It wasn’t restricted to only one pitch sort, both.
These issues had been magnified when he was at his worst; he merely wasn’t crushing pitches the best way you’d count on him to. His profile makes numerous sense if he’s bludgeoning the ball. Acceptable strikeout and stroll numbers and middling nook outfield protection aren’t that attention-grabbing with out energy, although.
For some folks, including energy principally means making an attempt to drag the ball extra. In a perfect world, I believe each hitter would do some model of that; it’s simply simpler to hit for energy to the pull facet, full cease. However swings and swing choices are advanced issues. Transferring one lever can have an effect on one thing seemingly unrelated, all down the chain. Suzuki was pulling the ball fairly incessantly when he hit the ball within the air in 2023, however with out the identical effectivity he displayed final 12 months.
Need that in numbers? Let’s evaluate 2022 to 2023 by means of August 8, the final day earlier than he rejoined the lineup full-time. His pull fee on balls he hit within the air elevated from 16% to twenty-eight%, which sounds glorious. However his slugging proportion declined by 150 factors on these balls, his anticipated slugging proportion declined by 120 factors, his wOBA declined by 120 factors, and his xwOBA declined by almost 100 factors. In different phrases, a decline involved high quality to the pull facet offset the advantages of getting the ball there extra typically.
In the meantime, his manufacturing on balls within the air that didn’t go to the pull facet additionally fell. I’m making a collection of assumptions right here, however it feels to me like he was simply too early on numerous pitches, so he ended up with extra so-so contact that was however pulled. Loads of hitters discuss making an attempt to remain up the center with their meant swing in order that in the event that they search for a fastball and get fooled, they’re pulling offspeed pitches down the road as a substitute of yanking them foul.
If that’s the case with Suzuki, you may think about what an inexpensive tradeoff seems to be like. Begin hanging again extra on fastballs, and he’d have a decrease pull fee when he places the ball within the air. He’d make up for it in two methods, although. First, he’d hit the ball the opposite approach or up the center with extra authority. Second, when he did pull a ball, it will extra probably be scalded because of the truth that what’s left within the pull bucket is a bunch of crushable pitches he received out in entrance of.
Fairly frankly, it’s wonderful how true that’s been. When he debuted final 12 months, he hit a ton of fastballs within the air, however solely 10% of these had been pulled. This 12 months, that quantity climbed above 20% whereas his contact high quality cratered. However lo and behold, he’s hit 23 fastballs within the air since returning, and he’s pulled precisely one in every of them. It was the form of ball you don’t have any selection however to drag, in on his palms, and he completely blistered it:
As an alternative, he’s peppering these pitches again up the center or to proper area. Just about every part about these balls – manufacturing, anticipated manufacturing, exit velocity, hard-hit fee, you title it – has improved. In different phrases, his swing is extra on time towards fastballs; he’s assembly them and driving them into the right-center hole with authority way over he did earlier within the 12 months.
In the meantime, he’s pulling the ball extra incessantly when he manages to carry a slower pitch, a full 33% of the time. He’s completely walloping these balls; he’s put 9 of them into play, and he’s batting 1.000 with a 2.778 slugging proportion on these 9 balls. His common – common! – exit velocity on them is 101.4 mph. He’s completely scalding this stuff, in different phrases.
In reality, Suzuki isn’t simply crushing breaking balls on accident. He’s looking them. He’s swung at 70% of the in-zone breaking balls he’s seen throughout his latest scorching streak, up from 60% in each 2022 and the beginning of this 12 months. That’s extra incessantly than he swings at in-zone fastballs. He’s chasing breaking balls extra typically, too, however given what occurs when he catches up with one, that looks like a rational tradeoff.
To be honest, I is likely to be studying an excessive amount of into it. He’s additionally swinging extra incessantly at fastballs, significantly within the strike zone. However the breaking ball swing charges are up extra, they usually appear extra intentional, and significantly, he’s destroying these breaking balls. It looks like a purposeful technique, and one which’s paying dividends instantly.
How lengthy can he sustain this new plan? I don’t need to say indefinitely, however I don’t see any apparent purpose that it must cease. He most likely received’t preserve slugging .915 when he places a breaking ball into play, however the total profile of smashed contact on comfortable pitches mixed with stable plate self-discipline speaks for itself. There’s no query Suzuki is on a scorching streak for the time being, taking part in above his true expertise stage, however even a back-down-to-earth model of that is a wonderful hitter.
There’ll, after all, be extra changes to come back. As he’s gotten extra aggressive towards in-zone comfortable stuff, pitchers haven’t modified what they’re throwing him. They’re difficult him simply as incessantly with these pitches. If I had been an opposing pitcher, I’d attempt to reap the benefits of Suzuki’s elevated aggression by throwing him extra pitches exterior of the strike zone. That may undoubtedly occur earlier than lengthy; how he adjusts to the adjustment will likely be attention-grabbing to observe. However I believe he’ll be capable of deal with it; as I discussed earlier than, he has a great sense of the strike zone. Tilting his decision-making in direction of swing aggression doesn’t imply he’ll instantly overlook what the zone seems to be like.
All instructed, I’m tremendously inspired by Suzuki’s latest surge. I strive to not learn an excessive amount of into 100-ish PA samples; just about anybody can have a scorching month. However the best way he’s doing it feels actual to me. This isn’t some fluke of soppy line drives falling in all over or grounders discovering holes within the infield. He’s simply pummeling the ball, and doing it in a approach that fits his recreation. Pulling extra fastballs isn’t a cure-all for what ails hitters, and Suzuki’s turnaround is a superb instance. For him, the best way ahead was trickier than that, however that doesn’t make it much less of a terrific plan.
All statistics on this article are present by means of Saturday, September 9.